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PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES
CHESTER ROHRLICH L
The current depression in security prices has not as yet changed the
trend towards wide-spread ownership of corporate securities' and it is too
early to determine the long-range effects of the concentration of security-
holdings resulting from the increased use of trust devices.2 It however
remains safe to assume that within the discernible future the average indi-
vidual security holding in the large American corporations will be, as it now
is, infinitesimally small. The result is utter powerlessness on the part of a
lone security-holder to participate effectively in corporate matters. Or-
dinarily he recognizes and accepts this state of affairs. He makes no pre-
tense of exercising any power of ownership theoretically his. Even "proxy-
voting", the usual limit of his participation, is valued so lightly that it is
reported that a small minority stockholder once obtained control of a large
corporation by the simple expedient of mailing stainped return envelopes
with the proxies he solicited whereas those who were in control at the time
sent out unstamped return envelopes. 3 In a recent popular book 4 the author,
a professor of law, remarks:
"Stockholders, especially small ones, are surprisingly indifferent
to all corporate ills and abuses, especially while dividends are being paid.
The lack of participation by stockholders in the actual management and
control of their corporations is itself perhaps the worst corporate evil.
The enormous number of shareholders may be in part responsible for
this. . . . When corporations have stockholders numbering in the
many thousands, it becomes impossible to hold corporate meetings which
amount to anything. . . . The growing tendency to corporate con-
trol by a small group, which in turn often is controlled by one man, has
given rise to a reign of corporate oligarchy. The many have been
drowned out by the few. The shareholders have become an empty
cipher. . . . If stockholders refuse or neglect to protect themselves;
if conditions are such as to make it difficult or impossible for them to
do so, the State must take up the cudgels in their behalf."
tLL. B., New York University, 1921; member of New York Bar; contributor to
numerous legal periodicals.
1Between December 31, 1929 and December 31, 1931 the number of holders of com-
mon shares in sixty-nine leading corporations increased, 48.8 per cent. At the end of 1931
over 4,000,000 persons owned the common stock of the sixty-five leading corporations listed
on the New York Stock Exchange. Some average individual holdings were: United
States Steel, 49.9 shares; American Tele. & Tele. Co., 29 shares; General Motors Cor-
poration, 14.7 shares. See New York Times, Feb. 7, 1932, Part 2, page 9.
'Meaning investment trusts, life insurance companies, living and testamentary trusts
under corporate trustees, and similar arrangements whereby single organizations are given
power (whether or not accompanied with beneficial ownership) over large investment funds.
'THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEXnENS (1931) 533.
"WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (193), 156 et seq.
(670)
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However, there are times when these stockholders, and holders of
other classes of corporate securities, are eager to influence the course of
corporate affairs. The possible issues are multifarious and not confined to
the financial reorganization of insolvent companies.8
Illustrative of such issues are questions of policy with respect to the
merger or sale of the company or with respect to dividends.
A recent cause celebre was the ill-fated Youngstown-Bethlehem merger.
Immediately upon announcement of the proposed merger by the directors
of Youngstown, its stockholders split into hostile camps. Proxy commit-
tees, pro and con, were organized 6 and these carried on intensive campaigns
for proxies wherein every conceivable method was employed.7  The struggle
was carried to the courts where the battle was equally intense; 8 the decision
was unfavorable to the proponents of the merger and the result was its
abandonment.")
A somewhat unique problem faced the security holders of the privately
owned transit lines in New York City as a result of attempts made for their
"unification". 10 One of the companies, The Interborough Rapid Transit
Company, was in control of voting-trustees acting under a voting-trust agree-
ment of 1922 and certain holders of voting-trust certificates, having different
views than the trustees concerning the proper method of dealing with the
situation, organized a Protective Committee 11 under a deposit agreement 12
which provided for the deposit with the committee of both voting-trust cer-
tificates and shares of capital stock which had not been deposited under the
voting-trust. The object of the organization of this Protective Committee
was to give these security holders direct representation in negotiations with
the City.
An interesting controversy over dividend and capital policies faced the
Northern Pipe Line a few years ago. A group of stockholders felt that
the company had cash in excess of its business requirements and that this
excess should be distributed to stockholders. Unable to persuade the man-
agement of the soundness of their opinion, they organized a proxy-committee
Legal limitations upon reorganizations will not be considered in this paper. See Cra-
vath, The Reorganization of Corporations, SomE LEGAL PHASES OF CORPoRATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917) 153; Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations:
Certain Developments in the Last Decade, SomE LaAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1931) 133. For committee problems resulting solely
therefrom, see Note (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 377; Rodgers, Riqhts and Duties of the Com-
nittee in Bondholders' Reorganizations (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 899.
' New York Times, March 14, 1930, at 28.
7New York Times, March 19, 193o, at 38; March 20, 193o, at 44; March 21, 193o, at
38; March 23, i93o, pt. ii, at 16, pt. iii, at 2.
' New York Times, Jan. 8, 1931, at 36; Jan. 25, 193i, at 26.
O New York Times, Oct. 16, 1931, at 34.
20A similar situation exists in Chicago. There too Protective Committees were or-
ganized (193o).
nNew York Times, March 15, 19.30, at A.
'Dated, March 15, 1930.
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which carried the issue directly to the stockholders. 13 The proxies obtained
enabled this committee to elect two out of five directors at the next annual
meeting of the company.' 4  This was followed by a cash distribution of
$2,000,000.15
It is obvious that upon such occasions the individual security holder
must find his lone efforts doomed at the outset to futility. Equally obvious
is it that union with other security holders of like mind affords a remedy for
the individual's weakness.
The random illustrations of internal corporate controversies adverted
to have indicated three devices in use for the effectuation of such unions,
the proxy-committee, the voting-trust, and the protective committee. They
have much in common, but also very substantial differences.
Pro.xy-Committees
A proxy has been simply defined as "an authority by one, having the
right to do a certain thing, to another to do it". 6
Although proxy-voting in corporations was not a common-law right,
it is now well-nigh universally validated by statute. 1 7  The governing law
is well settled: it is merely one aspect of agency law.'
It has become the practice for corporations to solicit proxies from
stockholders "unable to attend" running in favor of proxy-committees
(meaning by the term the persons, usually more than one, named in the
conjunctive and alternative, designated as the proxies) frankly selected by
the existing board of directors. In cases of conflict on corporate policies,
as we have already seen, opposition proxy-committees may be created which
solicit proxies from the stockholders.
The limitations of this method are inherent in the law of the subject.
By reason of the revocability of proxies, the proxy-committee has no assur-
ance that before it acts its proxies will not be revoked, either by express
revocation, the execution of a later proxy to another, or by the personal
attendance of the stockholder at the meeting. Because of this factor, the
proxy-committee as a means of corporate control may be used effectively
only in short contests. Furthermore, the method affords no means for rais-
ing funds whereby prolonged investigation or litigation may be conducted.' 9
To achieve "irrevocable proxies", the voting-trust was developed.
New York Times, Dec. 29, 1927, at 18.
'New York Times, Jan. 20, 1928, at 28.
'New York Times, March 29, 1928, at 39; June 14, 1928, at 38; June i6, 1928, at 28.
"Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 319, uIg N. E. 559, 561 (i9i8).
oTHomPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927), § 968.
' The corporation statutes frequently makes special rules; i. e., that proxies must be
in writing and are not valid after a certain period of time-see N. Y. GENERAL CORP. LAW
§ 19. It is also sometimes provided that proxies may not be sold-see N. Y. STOCK CORP.
LAW § 47, and N. Y. PENAL LAW § 668.
' In practice, an opposition proxy-committee may itself initially represent such sub-
stantial financial interests in the corporation as to make the raising of funds from outsiders
unimportant. In such cases proxies are solicited for the necessary votes or for the "moral"
effect.
PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES
Voting-Trusts
The fundamental differences between a proxy and a voting-trust have
been summarized thus,
2 0
"The usual proxy merely establishes a relation of principal and
agent terminable by the principal at will either through revocation or
through sale of his stock. The voting trust agreement vests in the
trustee an interest in the stock which the original owner obviously is
unable to nullify by any sale of the stock and which he cannot other-
wise cancel except through an attempted breach of contract. The
holder of a proxy has no control over the stock itself, while the voting
trustees have the possession of the stock as well as the legal title to it.
The proxy creates a relation of a temporary character under a re-
strictive statutory authority; the voting trust is created without the
need of statutory license 21 and confers not a revocable authority upon
an agent but a qualified title upon a transferee of property."
The law of voting-trusts has been many years in the making. Early
decisions date from a period when the nature of business corporations (at
least as now known) was little understood and even less sympathized with.
22
Voting trusts also labored under the odium which at one time attached to
the use of "trusts" as means of achieving business monopolies. The result
has been a vast accumulation of learning and precedent, with its inevitable
burdens as well as benefits.
23
In this paper the law of protective committees is treated as if it were
in all cases independent of the law of voting-trusts, leaving it to the courts
to draw analogies when desirable and; it is hoped, to overlook them when
inconsistent with present-day needs and practices.
CUSHING, VOTING TRUSTS, (2d ed. 19n) 162-3.
This statement is not universally true: the common lav of voting-trusts is uncertain
(infra). As to the effect of the enactment of voting-trust statutes upon the common law,
see Matter of Morse, 247 N. Y. 290, i6o N. E. 374 (1928); Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, 25
F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). The OHIO GENERAL CORP. AcT (1927) permitting vot-
ing trusts, expressly provided that the rights conferred were "in addition to rights at com-
mon law" § 34.
'Prof. Wormser, op. cit. supra note 4, at 48, fixes 1875 as the year when "the modem
American law of corporations was well under way". Even at that early date the voting
trust was already in use (see Cushing, op. cit. supra note 20, at 4 et seq.) and a decision
with respect to a very similar instrument was rendered as early as 1867, Brown v. Pacific
Mail S. S. Co., Fed. Gas. No. 2,025, at p. 42o (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1867).
' For those desirous of plowing this field beyond the scope of this paper, reference is made
to: Lilienthal, Corporate Voting and Public Policy (x887) io HAv. L. REv. 428; Baldwin,
Voting Trusts (1892) 1 YALE L. J. I; Moore, Voting Trusts in Corporations (1902) 36
Am. L. REv. 222; Rogers, Pooling Agreements Among Stockholders (igio) 19 YALE L. J.
345; Wormser, Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements (i91s) i8l
CoL L. Rxv. 123; Smith, Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts (1922) 22 CoL L.
REv. 627; Finkelstein, Voting Trust Agreements (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 344; CUSHnG,
VOTING TRUSTS (2d ed. 1927), having in mind Matter of Morse, supra note 21; Berger-
man, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 445. For Pennsylvania
cases, see Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 Atl. 1O3 (I91) and Commonwealth v. Royd-
house, 233 Pa. 234, 82 Ati. 74 (911).
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Protective Committees
Standing halfway, in more than one sense, between the proxy and the
voting-trust is the protective committee. Despite the close relationship of
all three, the protective committee differs fundamentally from both the
proxy-committee and the voting-trust. Before entering upon the detailed
study of the protective committee, it is well to note these basic differences.
Of the three, the protective committee alone is suited for use by the
holders of non-voting securities, such as bonds or non-voting classes of
stock.2 4 Both proxy committees and voting-trustees must, in general, achieve
their ends by the election of a favorable board of directors and then through
that board. This feature is dominant in the very definition of a voting
trust. "A voting trust agreement accumulates in the hands of a person or
persons shares of several 'owners, in trust for the purpose of voting them,
in order, through the selection and election of directors, to control the cor-
porate business and affairs." 25 On the other hand, a protective committee
may achieve its purpose not only through the board of directors but where
necessary against the wishes of the board, having in appropriate cases the
aid of the judicial machinery. This essential difference is functionally
recognized. The usual voting trust agreement confines the power of the
trustees to the election of directors and the collection of dividends and their
distribution to the certificate holders. As we shall see, protective committees
are generally empowered to do all things expedient in procuring the desired
result.
26
A characteristic difference in point of view between the voting trust and
the protective committee (and also the opposition proxy-committee) is like-
wise important. The former is directed towards general stability in man-
agement, the maintenance of the status quo 27 for a number of years; the
latter towards the overturn of the status quo (in part at least) for the ac-
complishment of a special, specific purpose. This difference is not fre-
quently found as explicitly delineated as it was in the case of the Seaboard
Air Line Railway. Early in 1904 the company was under the control of a
group of bankers by virtue of a voting trust theretofore created in connec-
tion with certain financing, but differences of opinion on financial matters
soon arose and an opposition stockholders' protective committee was organ-
ized by another group of bankers. 28  The deposit agreement expressly au-
In the Interborough Rapid Transit Company unification matter above referred to, one
Deposit Agreement (dated March i5, I93o) provided for the deposit with the same com-
mittee of capital stock and voting trust certificates therefor.
-Manson v. Curtis, supra note 16, at 319, 119 N. E. at 561 (i918).
'It should perhaps be expressly noted that in treating protective committees as a de-
vice for corporate-control, the word "control" is not used solely in its limited sense of com-
mand over a majority of the voting stock, but also in the broader sense of power to use the
corporation for the realization of a desired end.
In reorganizations, the voting trust device is used to assure continuance of the status
brought about by the reorganization.
(19O4) 79 COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 152, 734.
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thorized the committee to institute an action for the dissolution of the voting
trust.2 9
As an outgrowth of these fundamental differences it is generally true
that voting trusts aim to continue in being as long as legally possible, with
substantially no power of withdrawal in the 'depositor, whereas protective
committees endeavor to terminate their existence as soon as their objects
can be achieved, or accomplishment becomes patently impossible, and allow
considerably freer exercise of the right of withdrawal.30
The protective committee has a place peculiarly its own in corporate
affairs, a place which it has already achieved and promises to continue to
hold; it is well to endeavor to understand it.
The Committee
The committee is self-constituted, willing itself into being. The present
tendency is to invite, in addition to large holders of the security, men of
experience and prestige so that their names will serve to create confidence in
the committee.3 ' Committee members need not have any personal interest
in the security or the corporation. 32  An officer of the corporate-trustee
under a bond-indenture may serve on a committee for holders of bonds
issued thereunder 33 but that circumstance may induce the court in a fore-
closure suit brought by the trustee to permit non-depositing bondholders to
intervene.34  While the practice is looked upon with varying degrees of
favor, or disfavor, by different courts, even a receiver of the corporation
may act as a member of a committee of its security holders and will be re-
quired to resign only when a conflict between his two trusts is fore-
shadowed., It would seem that an officer of the corporation, owing a trust
duty to all its security holders, should not place himself in a position of
acting only for some of them.36
2 Cushing, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 25. A similar situation existed in the Interborough
unification matter above mentioned; but there the "protective committee" directed its efforts
towards electing a voting trustee favorable to its views, rather than towards attacking the
voting trust agreement per se (see New York Times, Aug. 26, 19.3o, at 3). The voting
trust agreement, dated Oct. I, 1922, provided that vacancies among the trustees be filled
by vote of the certificate holders and that the trustees should elect as directors of the Com-
pany persons nominated by various financially interested groups, including the certificate
holders.
" A few more particular differences between voting trusts and protective committees
are reserved for note hereafter.
" GERsTENBERG, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIo & MANAGEMENT (1924) 663; DEWING,
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (I926) 937-8. In a recent matter (Associated Rayon
Corporation) two banking houses acting in their firm names constituted the Committee (see
New York Times, May 14. 193o, at 4.5, 46). The protective agreement, dated May I4, 1930,
provided: "S. & Co. and L. Brothers shall act respectively as copartnerships and in case of
any change in either firm such firm as from time to time constituted shall be deemed par-
ties of the second part hereunder, as though originally named herein, and the survivors or
continuing members of any such firm may execute any assignment or transfer necessary
to vest in the successor firm all powers, rights, or title of the prior firm hereunder."
"Haines v. Kinderhook & Hudson Rv., 33 App. Div. 1,54, 53 N. Y. Supp. 368 (898).
3 Palmer v. Bankers Trust Co., iz F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
" Central Trust Co. v. Chicaeo, R. I. & P. R. R.. 218 Fed. 336 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
s Fowler v. Jarvis-Conklin Mtge. Co., 63 Fed. 888 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1894).
=Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U. S. 616 (1874).
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The committee informally brought together takes its legal status, nunc
pro tunc as it were, from the "deposit agreement" which it prepares to give
itself formal being.
The Deposit Agreement and the Powers, Duties and Liabilities of the Coin-
mittee Thereunder
The committee's counsel should not, in the words of Paul D. Cravath,
37
"attempt to evolve a deposit agreement out of his own consciousness". So
many agreements are now readily available that they should be freely used
as models; 38 however, the availability of forms and the ease of the "scissors
and paste" method must not lead to forgetfulness of the need to frame each
agreement to meet its specific purpose. This must be sought after, not by
narrow limitations, nor by undue reliance upon mere broad sweeping general
clauses.
The parties to the agreement are the members of the committee, who
execute the instrument, and the depositors, who become such under the
provisions of the agreement, either by executing the agreement, or merely
by depositing their securities and accepting certificates of deposit therefor.39
After the usual designation of the parties and the recital of the circum-
stances leading to the execution of the deposit agreement, the customary
form proceeds more or less along the following outline:
(A) The Committee is constituted as such.
(B) Provision is made for the deposit of the designated securities.
(C) The Depositary is named and its powers and duties are set forth,
as are the powers of the Committee with respect to the depositary.
(D) The depositors agree not to take any independent action with re-
spect to the deposited securities, and the rights of the Committee
in and to the deposited securities are defined.
40
CRAVATH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 164.
A "bondholders' protective agreement" in a reorganization is analyzed and printed
in full in TRACY, CORPORATE FORECLOSURES (1929) 15-19, 409-427. Dewing, in his FINAN-
CIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926), quotes at length the late Adrian H. Joline's summary
FLETCHER, CORPORATION FORMS (2d ed., 1923) 746, 15o3. Mr. Cravath's lecture, supra note
5, contains many helpful suggestions as to their preparation. Many of the cases cited in this
I aper contain lengthy quotations from, and detailed descriptions of, the agreements in-
volved. Four voting trust agreements are printed in full in CUSHING, op. cit. supra note 20,
but it should be noted that one of them (Bank of America) was held invalid in Matter of
Morse, supra note 21.
The depositary may, but need not, be a party. If the committee is empowered to em-
ploy a depositary, it may do so, and the depositary need not be a party to the agreement
in order to act. It is well, however, to procure the depositary's approval of the proposed
deposit agreement, because it is vitally concerned with the provisions thereof, particularly
with those dealing with its duties and immunities. It is customary to name the depositary
in the agreement and" give the committee power to change it.
' In the older forms the committee was generally described as having title to the de-
posited securities and all the rights of owners. In the newer forms the committee is given
the same broad powers, but to be exercised by virtue of an irrevocable power of attorney
from the depositors to the committee, the depositors reserving title until such time as the
committee, at its option, elects to take title, which option is generally exercisable by the
filing of a notice of election with the depositary. One advantage of this procedure is to en-
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(E) Terms and conditions of deposit, such as time within which de-
posit must be made, the committee being given power to vary.4
(F) Provisions with respect to the issuance, transfer, registration, etc.,
of certificates of deposit.
(G) Methods of giving notice to depositors.
(H) Specific powers to meet the particular situation.
42
(I) Provisions with respect to dissent and withdrawal by depositors.
43
(J) General powers to committee. 44  Among the customary ones are:
a To add to their number, accept resignations and fill vacancies;
b To act by a majority 4' and the members by proxy; c To employ
depositary, counsel, engineers and other agents, and to pay them;
d To fix their own compensation; 40 e To use the deposited se-
curities for expenses and for purposes of plan either by sale or
pledge or otherwise; 4' f To adjust claims and institute suits;
g To construe the agreement, 48 supply omissions, correct defects
and (usually only with the consent of a specified percentage of the
depositors) to change the agreement; 49 h To deal for their own
individual benefit with securities of the class called for deposit,
and to deal with the corporation.5"
(K) Exculpatory clauses in favor of committeemen designed to limit
liability of each for his own wilful misconduct only,51 and in
favor of depositary, particularly aiming to protect it in acting upon
directions of the committee.
able the committee to file a larger number of claims in bankruptcy. Voting trustees are
generally given the full powers of "absolute owners", subject only, in some cases, to special
limitations.
41 When it is doubtful whether the value of the deposited securities will be sufficient
to create a fund for committee expenses, the payment of a sum may be made a condition
of deposit. Although voting trustees generally reserve the power to charge certificate hold-
ers with expenses and to withhold. such charges from dividends received, the more usual
practice is to place the burden of the expenses upon the corporation; but see Clark v. Na-
tional Steel & Wire Co., 82 Conn. 178, 72 Atl. 93o (i9O9), where it was held that, the cor-
poration not being a party to the voting trust agreement, it could not pay expenses incurred
by the trustees thereunder.
4
2 Express powers will not be extended by "construction", Industrial General Trust,
Ltd. v. Tod, I7o N. Y. 233, 6.3 N. E. 28.5 (igo2). It is proper to provide that any con-
templated new corporation may be organized under the laws of a state to be selected by
the committee, even if the laws of such state differ from those of the domicile of the old
corporation or from that of the situs of the agreement, Cowell v. City Watee Supply Co.,
ISo Iowa 671, 105 N. W. ioi6 (i9o6).
'3 It is usual to require as a condition for the exercise of the right of withdrawal the
payment of a pro rata share of the expenses.
"No general powers are implied, Industrial General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, supra note 42.
41 Haines v. Kinderhook & Hudson Ry. Co., supra note 32; Coppell v. Hollins, 9i Hun
570, 36 N. Y. Supp. 5oo (1895), aff'd, 159 N. Y. 551, 54 N. E. 1o89 (1899).
"'But the compensation which the committee vote to themselves is subject to judicial
review, Livingston v. Falk, 217 App. Div. 360, 217 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1926).
"The committee would have implied power to make necessary expenditures, Cowell v.
City Water Supply Co., supra note 42.
"The committee's construction must be fair, not arbitrary, and made in good faith,
Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, supra note 42; Industrial & General Trust, Ltd.
v. Tod, iSo N. Y. 21.5, 73 N. E. 7 (1904).
A provision to the effect that all depositors shall be bound by the action of a majority
is valid, Olcott v. Powers, 6o Hun 583, is N. Y. Supp. 263 (i8qi).
10Such a clause waiving the usual contrary rule applicable to trustees is valid, Miller
v. Dodge, 28 Misc. 640, 59 N. Y. Supp. io7o (i899).
No one member would be liable for the defaults of another, Riker v. Alsop, 27 Fed.
251 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i886), rez'd, (on other grounds), 155 U. S. 448, 15 Sup. Ct. 16z
(i894). As to exculpatory clauses generally, infra.
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(L) Relieving the committee from responsibility for failure of plan;
in some agreements the committee expressly undertakes to en-
deavor in good faith to carry out purpose.
5 2
(M) Denying power to committee to obligate depositors personally, but
subjecting the deposited securities to all charges incurred by com-
mittee.
(N) Provisions as to expiration and termination.
(0) Procedure for accounting by committee.
(P) Disclaimer of any obligations to non-depositors.
The deposit agreement is of course a contract and its terms may not
be disregarded. 3  In so far as its construction is concerned, the courts
endeavor to apply two principles, leaning towards one or the other as the
equities of the situation as seen by the particular court seem to demand.
The first of these rules of construction is that the deposit agreement will be
construed most favorably to the depositors and strictly against the com-
mittee.5 4  The second of these principles is that the agreement will be con-
strued liberally to enable the committee to achieve the desired results. "5
A good indication of how the courts have actually met this inconsistency
-verbal inconsistency at least-can be obtained from looking at a few cases
wherein questions as to the powers of reorganization committees were
involved.
In Mills v. Potter,"0 the court expressly accepted as sound the rule that
the agreement "should be construed strictly", but proceeded, in view of the
"peculiar" circumstances and the "situation of the parties", in this case to
give the agreement a rather broad and liberal meaning. The agreement
involved was a usual reorganization agreement under which the committee
was specifically authorized to purchase the property upon foreclosure, raise
money for "the purposes of the agreement" and "supply defects or omis-
sions in the plan". The committee was required to allot "to the certificate
' It would seem that such an obligation should be implied, but see Colonial Trust Co.
v. Wallace, 183 Fed. 897 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i9io).
Cox v. Stokes, 156 N. Y. 491, 51 N. E. 36 (i898) ; Habirshaw Electric Cable Co.
v. Habirshaw Electric Co., 296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). Deposit agreements have not
been subjected to the attacks on their validity which were so vigorously urged against vot-
ing trust agreements. This may be due to the fact that most deposit agreements which
have reached the courts involved bonds, rather than voting stocks, where the legal problems
are somewhat more difficult. It may also be due to the trend away from such attacks
even where voting trust agreements are involved. This trend can be readily noted by read-
ing the material cited under note 23 chronologically, and by comparing the first edition of
TnomPSON, CORPORAtTIONS (1895) §§ 6404-6414, with the third edition of the same work
(1927) § 991. The trend was noted by the courts in Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life
Ins. Co., II Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412 (i9io) and in Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, mspra note 21.
r'Carter v. First Nat. Bank, 128 Md. 581, 98 Atl. 77 (x916) ; Industrial & General
Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 17o N. Y. 233, i8o N. Y. 2125, supra note 48; United Water Works
v. Omaha Water Co., 164 N. Y. 41, .58 N. E. 58 (i9oo). This rule is justified on the
double ground that the depositors are cestuis que trusts and that the agreement is pre-
pared by the committee.
Venner v. Fitzgerald, 91 Fed. 335 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i899); White v. Wood, 229
N. Y. 527, 29 N. E. 835 (1892).
W 189 Mass. 238, 75 N. E. 627 (i9o5).
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holders their proportionate interests in the securities of any new company
which may be organized". The plan and circulars issued by the committee
indicated that improvements to the property were necessary and that new
money would be required for that purpose. The court held that the com-
mittee acted properly in continuing to hold the stock of the new corporation
to which the property had been conveyed "for a reasonable time" and during
that time to cause the corporation to make contracts and raise moneys for
improvements by means of a mortgage prior in lien to the securities dis-
tributable to the depositors.
A New Jersey court 57 showed the same spirit when it construed "mat-
ters of detail" to include not only formal matters "but also such alterations
in the terms of the agreement itself (not changing the plan) as might be
deemed necessary or advisable to effectuate the object". The reorganization
agreement there provided for the issuance of bonds payable "in thirty years",
and the court held it to have been within the province of a "committee of
detail", appointed to carry out the plan, to grant the corporation the option
to prepay the bonds before maturity.
In sharp contrast are the decisions rendered against the "Bondholders'
Committee" in the American Water Works reorganization by the New York
Court of Appeals s and by .a federal court sitting in Massachusetts.5 9  In
these cases a clause of the agreement reading:
"The committee shall prior to the conveyance of any purchased
property to a new company, submit to the certificate holders a detailed
plan of reorganization, which shall be binding upon all said holders,
unless the holders of a majority in interest of the outstanding certifi-
cates shall, within thirty days, file with the trust company their written
dissent from said plan .
was construed to give to the committee power only to provide for "details",
"minor particulars", and not "matters of substance". Accordingly a plan
providing for recognition of junior security holders 0 was held outside the
provisions of the agreement, and the creation of a voting trust of the stock
of the new corporation was held violative of the requirement in the agree-
ment that the "committee shall, after payment of the expenses of foreclosure
and all expenses incurred by the committee, and its compensation, allot to
the certificate holders their proportionate interests in the new company".0 1
ILehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Central R. R., 34 N. J. Eq. 88 (i88).
' United Water Works Co. v. Omaha Water Co., szpra note 54.
" United Water Works Co. v. Stone, 127 Fed. 587 (C. C. D. Mass. 1904).
' See also Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Centralia & C. R. R., o6 Fed. 636 (C. C. A.
7th, 1899) where it was held that a bondholders' committee was not authorized to consent
"Warren v. Pim, 65 N. J. Eq. 36, 55 At. 66 (19o3) ; Warren v. Pim, 66 N. J. Eq. 353,
59 AtI. 773 (1904) (which contain an exhaustive discussion of the validity of voting trusts)
involved questions as to the extent to which a committee may go in setting up a voting
trust, even where its creation was specifically, but in general terms, authorized by the
depositors.
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Because of these variations depositors were held not bound by the plan not-
withstanding the fact that a majority had not dissented.
Another reorganization committee, which had very broad powers to
deal with property acquired upon a foreclosure sale and which was specifi-
cally authorized to create such liens "as may be necessary in the discretion
of the committee to carry out the plan . . or to protect or develop the
said property . . . or for any purpose the committee may deem wise or
necessary", determining that exploration work was necessary, entered into
an agreement with an "Exploration Company" under which it was to do
the work and expend such sums "as in its uncontrolled discretion it deemed
necessary" and for the repayment of which it was given a lien. Despite
the conceded good faith of the committee and the Exploration Company, 2
it was held that the agreement was beyond the powers of the committee on
the ground that it could not delegate the discretion vested in it to another.13
One of the unsettled problems is the effect to be given the exculpatory
clauses of the agreement, which ordinarily in the most sweeping terms seek
to relieve members of the committee from any liability except personal
liability for wilful default. The question is, of course, part of the general
problem as to how far liability may be contracted away, and more specially
by fiduciaries.6 4
It may be stated that no provision can shield the committee from lia-
bility if it acts in bad faith.65 If the court finds bad faith, the committee
may be held liable for the losses sustained without regard to whether the
members of the committee profited personally and without the necessity of
first setting aside the deposit agreement.66 On the other hand, when the
court finds that the committee acted in good faith, the exculpatory clauses
will be given full effect.67 In such cases there is no liability for errors of
judgment or for being "overreached" when the agreement stipulates that
there is no liability except for "wilful malfeasance or gross negligence". 68
The danger lies in the possibility that a court may conclude that a breach
of the deposit agreement is proof of bad faith.
In Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod,6" the agreement conferred
"almost unlimited powers" upon the committee, gave it power to construe
the agreement and supply omissions, and the committee was expressly ex-
empted from liability except for "wilful misconduct". The committee failed
'But it should be noted that the committee had failed to disclose the agreement with
the Exploration Company to the depositors.
6 Titus v. U. S. Smelting, R. & M. Exp. Co., 231 Fed. 205 (I916), aff'd, 240 Fed.
881 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
"See Posner, Liability of the Trustee Under the Corporate Indenture (1928) 42
HARv. L. Rav. 198, 239; Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 174 N. E. 648 (1931).
'Parker v. New England Oil Co., 13 F. (2d) 158 (D. Mass. 1926), rev'd, i9 F. (2d)
9o3 (C. C. A. ist, 1927).
Ibid.
Van Siclen v. Bartol, 95 Fed. 793 (C. C. E. D. Pa. i899).
Ibid.
'o 8o N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7 (904).
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to publish a plan of reorganization until after the reorganization had been
completed. The provisions of the agreement were construed to have im-
pliedly required the publication of a plan before reorganization, so that the
depositors might have a reasonable opportunity to dissent, and the committee
was held liable to a depositor.70
The Depositary and its Certificates of Deposit
As we have seen, it is more usual not to require would-be depositors
to sign the deposit agreement, but to provide for their adhesion to the agree-
ment by the deposit of securities and the acceptance of a certificate of deposit
therefor. These certificates are usually issued by a trust company chosen
by the committee as its "depositary". The trustee under a bond-indenture
may act as depositary for a committee of holders of bonds issued there-
under.7 ' Certificates of deposit are, at common law, not negotiable instru-
ments, 7 2 but every effort is made to render them negotiable in fact and in
law. In form they are made transferable either by mere delivery (bearer
certificates) or by transfer on books kept for that purpose by the depositary.
It is not infrequent to list certificates of deposit upon stock exchanges, if
the securities they represent are so listed. Legal negotiability is sought
after by appropriate provisions in the deposit agreement. 73 Negotiability
may, of course, be conferred by statute. 4
In general the situation with regard to the issuance and transfer of
certificates of deposit is analogous to that with regard to corporate stock.75
The requirement of the agreement that the security must be deposited
with the depositary in exchange for its certificate of deposit may be waived
by the committee, and it is waived, if the committee, by one of its members
or officers, accepts a security tendered for deposit.
76
Depositors
The "depositors". are, by definition, those who are parties to the deposit
agreement by virtue of holding certificates of deposit.
77
' 0 The only indication of "bad faith" in the opinions is that the committee had assured
the plaintiff that a plan would be formulated in advance. On the other hand, one of the
dissenting justices pointed out that there was no charge of either fraud or wilful miscon-
duct.
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 588 (W. D. Wash. 1914);
Palmer v. Bankers Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 434 (N. D. II. 1926).
'Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Howard, 74 U. S. 392 (1868).
'As to whether negotiability may be conferred by agreement, see Evertson v. National
Bank of Newport, 66 N. Y. 14 (1876); Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45
(1928); Note (1924) 33 YALE: L. J. 302.
' See Article 8 (adopted 1926) of N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW dealing with "se-
curity receipts".
Cassagne v. Marvin, 143 N. Y. 292, 38 N. E. 285 (1894). This is also true of voting
trust certificates, see Union Trust Co. v. Oliver, 214 N. Y. 517, iOS N. E. 809 (1915).
" Hitchock v. Midland RR., 33 N. J. Eq. 86, (i88o), aff'd, 34 N. J. Eq. 278.
7'The failure actually to receive a certificate of deposit will not deprive one of the
right to participate, if in fact he has deposited with the committee, Hitchock v. Midland
RR., supra note 76.
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Ordinarily-and it should be expressly so provided--one is a party to
the agreement only to the extent of the securities deposited, but, in the
absence of a provision to the contrary, a court may find that one who has
signed a deposit agreement as the holder of a stated number of shares of
stock is also bound as to after-acquired stocks and bonds.78
It is for the depositors that the committee is trustee " and it is to them
that it owes fiduciary obligations.8 0 It is not fruitful to attempt exact
definition as to whether the relationship is one of agency, bailment, assign-
ment, or trust. All these terms, and others, have been applied by the
courts 8- but all are consistent with the notion of a fiduciary relationship.
One of the results is that a depositor may compel the committee to account.82
The "agency" of the committee is not such that it may bind the de-
positors personally in favor of third persons, the committee alone being
liable as principal on its contracts.8 3 But where the obligations incurred
are proper the committee may, in the absence of provisions in the agreement
to the contrary, obtain reimbursement from the depositors on an implied
agreement by the depositors to pay necessary expenses.8 4  And, of course,
the committee may bind the deposited securities.8 5
The aim of the courts is to keep all depositors on equality; 6 but the
failure of some to perform their obligations 87 does not affect the other
depositors, 8 nor serve to relieve the committee from its trusteeship.89
The deposit agreement may contain an agreement adopting in advance
any plan which the committee may formulate."  It is more customary,
" Tillotson v. Independent Breweries Co., 216 Mo. App. 412, 268 S. W. 425 (1925).
But cf. Riker v. Alsop, 27 Fed. 251 (I886), rev'd, (on other grounds), 155 U. S. 448, IS
Sup. Ct. 162 (1894).United Waterworks, Ltd. v. Stone, supra note 59.
8' Cassagne v. Marvin, supra note 75; Carter v. First National Bank, supra note 54.
"Agency-Miller v. Dodge, supra note 5o; Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, i8o
N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7 (1904). Contra: Mines Management Co. v. Close, 186 App. Div.
23, 174 N. Y. Supp. 8o (1gig). Bailnent-Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, supra.
Assigniment-Mines Management Co. v. Close, supra. Trust-Cowell v. City Water Sup-
ply Co., supra note 42; United Water Works Co. v. Omaha Water Co., supra note 54; Amer-
ican Trust Co. v. Holtsinger, 226 Mass. 30, 114 N. E. 956 (1917) ; Parker v. New England
Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 392 (1924), rev'd, ig F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. ist, 1927). Power of
Attorney coupled with an interest-Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 13 F. (2d) 158 (D.
Mass. 1926), rev'd, ig F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. Ist, 1927).
' Mawhinney v. Bliss, 117 App. Div. 255, 1O2 N. Y. Supp. 279 (i9oy), aff'd, 189 N. Y.
501, 81 N. E 1169 (19o7). The court found the allegations of the complaint to be incon-
sistent with "good faith" on the part of the committee, and refused to pass on the ques-
tion whether a depositor might, before the committee is afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to perform, compel an accounting without alleging bad faith, negligence, or breach
of trust.
' Mines Management Co. v. Close, supra note 8r.
"Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Lenning, io6 Pa. 144 (1884).
'Central Trust Co. v. Carter, 78 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896).
"Fuller v. Venable, 118 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 4th, 19o2).
'Each depositor must of course comply with the terms of the agreement in order to
be entitled to participation. Carpenter v. Catlin, 44 Barb. Ch. 75 (N. Y. 1865).
'Cushman v. Bonfield, 139 I1. 219, 28 N. E. 937 (891).
'Indiana, I. & I. R. R. v. Swanneli, 157 Ill. 616, 41 N. E. 989 (1895).
'Ginty v. Ocean Shore R. R., 172 Cal. 31, 155 Pac. 77 (1916) ; Colonial Trust Co. v.
Vallace, supra note 52.
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however, to require the committee to promulgate a plan and give the de-
positors the right to dissent therefrom.91 A provision to the effect that any
promulgated plan shall be binding upon all depositors unless a majority dis-
sent is valid.
2
Depositors may withdraw deposited securities only pursuant to the
terms of the deposit agreement,93 but the abandonment by the committee
of its functions, 4 or a breach of duty on the part of the committee 95 may
justify withdrawal. Thus it has been held 06 that the issuance of a new
bond issue in an amount substantially larger than provided for in the agree-
ment is sufficient to release depositors. In a case 9 where the deposit agree-
ment was construed as imposing no obligation upon the committee, which
had the right to terminate the agreement at its pleasure, it was held, in the
absence of an express prohibition, that a depositor might withdraw at any
time. A clause expressly permitting withdrawal within sixty days from
the publication of a plan was there held not to deprive a depositor of the
right to withdraw before the formulation of a plan.
Of course, a depositor may cease to be such, if the agreement so pro-
vides-and it usually does, not only by dissent and/or withdrawal, but also
by the mere transfer to another of his certificate of deposit, but then the
securities remain bound and .the transferee becomes the depositor.
Non-Depositors and Third Persons
The agreement need not be open to all the security holders of a cor-
poration, nor even to all of the same class."' While, ordinarily, the com-
mittee endeavors to procure the largest amount of deposited securities of
the permitted class, there is no obligation upon the committee to call atten-
tion to its existence or to solicit deposits.99
Although there may be circumstances under which the committee may
become chargeable with fiduciary obligations to other interested parties,' 00
it may be stated as a general rule that the committee owes no duty to non-
"The dissent must be in toto; that is, one may not accept parts of the planj and reject
other parts. Miller v. Dodge, supra note 50.Cowell v. City Water Supply Co., mipra note 42.
'Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Co., .supra note 53.
Lucey Mfg. Corp. v. Morlan, 14 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, i8o N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7 (1904).
'Miller v. Rutland & Washington R. IL, 40 Vt. 399 (1867).
'Colonial Trust Co. v. Wallace, supra note 52; cf. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v.
Habirshaw Electric Co., supra note 53 at 88o.
'Fidelity Ins. & Safe Deposit Co. v. Roanoke Street Ry., 98 Fed. 475 (C. C. W. D.
Va. 1899); Munson v. Magee, 2 App. Div. 333, 47 N. Y. Supp. 942. (1897), aff'd, 161
N. Y. 182, .5 N. E. 916 (igoo) ; Moss v. Geddes, 28 Misc. 291, 59 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1899).
In reorganizations under judicial supervision, the court may possibly insist upon a reason-
able right of participation for all of the same class; but as to that see supra note 5. It is
generally required, either by statute or decision, that voting trust agreements be open to
all stockholders.
Moss v. Geddes, mtpra note 98. Voting trust statutes generally require that voting
trust agreements be public and open to inspection by all stockholders.
00See Parker v. New England Oil Co., 8 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1925), reZd, 19 F.
(2d) 903 (C. C. A. Ist, 1927).
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depositors. 101 But it should be careful not to hold itself out as acting for
all.' O Provisions in the deposit agreement indicating that holders of other
classes of securities may be permitted certain participation under the plan,
may be only ex gratia and not impose any liability in their favor.10 3
A non-depositor may not compel the acceptance of his securities after
the expiration of the time limited for deposit, even though the committee
may be accepting belated deposits from others.' On the other hand, the
committee having accepted a deposit after the time limited therefor, a de-
mand on the part of depositors that the late-comers be excluded will be
regarded as lacking "the essential element of equity". 0 5 Even where par-
ticipation may be compelled, it must be sought seasonably.1° 6
Generally, the subject of "strangers' dealings" with the committee may
be sufficiently summarized by saying, in addition to what has already been
noted, that they are held chargeable with notice as to the terms of the de-
posit agreement.' 0 7  However, the terms of the agreement will probably be
liberally construed in favor of innocent third persons, particularly where
the complaining depositor has received benefits or has been guilty of laches. 08
Committee Communications
Active committees make it a practice to issue from time to time state-
ments as to their progress and prospects. Although this desire to make
their proceedings public is a wholly laudatory one, great care must be ex-
ercised in the preparation of all committee communications to depositors,
non-depositors, and to the depositary. The need for caution arises espe-
cially, because, under the usual agreement, the committee is empowered to
take various actions which become effective and binding upon the giving
of certain specified notice. It is, therefore, important always to distinguish
sharply between mere informative announcements and notices of formal
action. These matters do not frequently reach the stage of litigation, but
there is at least one reported case '09 that indicates the danger. In that case,
a "Plan and Agreement of Reorganization" provided for the issuance of
first mortgage bonds in an amount up to $ioo,ooo,ooo. The committee
was empowered to modify the agreement in respects deemed by it not sub-
stantial; and the agreement further provided for substantial changes by the
'B3ound v. South Carolina R. R., 78 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th, I897).
'Walker v. Whelan, 4 Phila. 389 (Pa. 1861).
'" Miller v. Dodge, supra note 50.
'Keane v. Moffly, 217 Pa. 24o, 66 Atl. 319 (1907).
' Walker v. Montclair & Greenwood Lake Ry., 3o N. J. Eq. 525 (1879). This was
a proceeding to set aside a foreclosure sale; but query whether the same result would be
reached in a direct proceeding promptly brought to enforce the terms of the agreement.
This note of course assumes that the deposit agreement, contrary to the usual practice,
vests no discretion in the committee as to the time within which to accept deposits.
'Landis v. West Pa. R. R., 133 Pa. 579, ig Atl. 556 (i89o).
' Central Trust Co. v. Carter, 78 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896).
'Lyman v. Kansas City & A. R. R., ioi Fed. 636 (C. C. W. D. Mo. igoo).
'Barnard v. Fitzgerald, 23 Misc. 18I, 50 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1898).
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committee, provided a copy of the proposed change be lodged with the
depositary and advertised. The committee issued an announcement that
"no material modification of the plan appears necessary except that the two
classes of the junior bonds . . may have to be offered a somewhat
smaller allotment in the new first mortgage bonds . . so as to enable
the committee to limit the issue of new first mortgage 4 per cent bonds
[which under the plan was fixed at $ioo,ooo,ooo] to $75,000,000 for re-
organization purposes, .. . " The announcement concluded with the
statement:
"While modifications in the other features of the plan appear not
to be required under present conditions, the committee deems it prudent
to postpone the formal declaration that the plans all become oper-
ative.
Thereafter the committee declared operative the "plan of reorganization
with the modification heretofore published". Upon the reorganization the
committee found it necessary to issue $9o,ooo,ooo of new first mortgage
bonds. The plaintiff sued to restrain the issuance of more than $75,000,000,
claiming that the committee's announcement constituted a modification of
the plan.
The decision was in favor of the committee because no modification
was filed with the depositary, the advertising of the notice was not in the
manner specified for modifications, and no provision for dissent and with-
drawal was made as required by the agreement in cases of modification.
The court also held that the announcement "did not constitute a representa-
tion or warranty binding upon the committee".
Termination of Agreement and Accounting by Committee
Most agreements provide for a definite date of termination, 110 coupled
with some limited power to the committee to extend the date, and give to
the committee unlimited power to terminate the agreement at any earlier
date.""
It is customary to impose upon the committee the duty to account at
the termination of the agreement and to provide the mechanics therefor. 112
nO This may be required by certain stock exchanges, if the certificates of deposit are
to be listed. The New York Stock Exchange requires that deposit agreements terminate
within five years.
I The power to terminate the agreement does not render it void for want of mu-
tuality. White v. McCullagh, 74 W. Va. 16o, 8I S. E. 720 (1914). But see Colonial Trust
Co. v. Wallace, supra note 52.
1 The committee may maintain an action in equity for the settlement of its accounts.
Mills v. Potter, I89 Mass. 238, 75 N. E. 627 (i9o5) ; Coppell v. Hollins, supra note 45.
Apparently, in the absence of provisions to the contrary in the agreement, all depositors
would be necessary defendants. For a case involving an accounting by voting trustees upon
a sale of the deposited stock pursuant to a supplemental agreement authorizing such sale see
Lewis v. Adriance, ioo Misc. 725, i66 N. Y. Supp. 774 (I916), aff'd, 179 App. Div. 958
(1917), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 663, 123 N. E. 876 (i9i).
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Where the organization or reorganization of a corporation is contemplated,
the accounting may be rendered to the board of directors of the corporation.
Where the entire corporation is not involved, the committee may file an
accounting with the depositary under appropriate provisions of the agree-
ment, making such filed account conclusive upon all depositors who do not
object thereto within a limited time. In case of objections the newer agree-
ments provide for the arbitration of disputed items.
Conclusion
So long as corporations continue to exist with private ownership of
their securities, so long will the problem of their control be a vital one. The
mechanics of control are diverse. The protective committee device, which
has rendered very many years Of valuable aid in corporate reorganizations,
is capable of extension as an important adjunct to proxy-committees and
voting trusts in struggles over corporate policies. Its technique, generally
uniform, is simple and well known; the law governing it is reasonably well
settled. The apparent inconsistencies in the decisions can in large measure
be avoided by careful draftsmanship, always remembering, however, that
courts will be greatly influenced by their views of the equities. Barring
basic economic changes or widespread and notorious abuses of the device,
it may be assumed that the protective committee will continue to play a
prominent role in corporate affairs.
